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Maura Hennigan's Position on Boston University's Biolab
In 2004, Boston University
Medical Center (BUMC) applied to the federal government for money to build a
lab where researchers will work on microbes used for bioterrorism
and biowarfare.
BU officials have demonstrated through word and deed, that they are
incapable of safely handling such dangerous microbes and unwilling to put
public safety ahead of their financial interests. Mayor Menino
has chosen to overlook these shortfalls and has been an unwavering supporter of
BU and the project developers.
This proposal is driven by
BUMC’s desire to have access to the government subsidies
they expect to be flowing from the Dept. of Homeland Security.
BUMC’s proposed lab would bring no benefit to the city. It
will bring great risk and no reward. I
am strongly opposed to this lab, as currently proposed by Boston University.
Background
Following
the anthrax attacks of Oct. 2001, President Bush seized on public fear to push
for expanding U.S. research in the area of bioweapons and bioterrorism
agents. This project, named Bioshield, channels money from the Dept. of Homeland
Security through the National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Disease
(NIAID) to laboratories set up to work with the microbes used as biological
weapons. The project is touted as
defensive in nature, intended only to develop vaccines and other
countermeasures to bioterrorism. However, the anthrax used in the attacks in
2001 was stolen from a similar “defensive” program within the Defense Dept.,
and it was used to kill and injure several individuals as well as cause
billions of dollars in damage. The
National Academy of Sciences has warned against the uncontrolled expansion of
experiments with these dangerous organisms.
Under Project
Bioshield, BUMC applied for a grant to build a Biosafety Level 4 lab (BSL4).
These labs are designed to work with the most
contagious and deadly diseases that have no cures.
BUMC intends to build this lab in the heart of Boston, in the South End/Roxbury area.
Since word of this lab has been made public,
citizens groups have been mobilizing to prevent this lab from being built in
our city (http://www.ace-ej.org/BiolabWeb/biolab.html).
BU’s proposed lab will not
be an attraction for the biotech industry.
Mayor Menino
and other supporters of BUMC’s proposed lab claim
that this lab will be a magnet for the biotech industry.
It seems to have escaped Mayor Menino that the
Boston area is booming with biotech already.
There is not a biotech or pharmaceutical company that is not already here or is planning on opening an office in
Boston . Biotech is not interested in BSL4 labs. The biotech
industry is centered in Boston and San Francisco, areas that have great universities where
information flows openly. Biotech has not sprung up around the existing BSL4 labs at the CDC in
Atlanta or at Ft. Dettrich, Maryland. BSL4 and the
military projects that go on there lead to secrecy, and that is not attractive
to biotech.
Biotech is interested in developing blockbuster drugs for chronic conditions.
They are not interested in vaccines and are
barely interested in infectious disease prevention.
This is evidenced by their unwillingness to even produce a flu vaccine, which is the domain of government labs.
BU’s proposed lab will not
add to Boston’s job pool.
BU claims that the
construction of the lab will generate 1,300 temporary construction jobs and 660
permanent jobs. This would be true of any project at that site.
BU has been totally disingenuous in their
Draft Environmental Impact Statement, stating that if their BSL4 lab does not
get built, that property will go fallow. This lot is highly desirable property
that would easily be filled with any biomedical research facility.
If the lot remains empty, it is because BU
wishes to punish the community for opposing their project.
BU’s proposed lab will put
our tourism industry at risk
We are putting one of our
most lucrative industries at risk. If
there is even a rumor of a strange disease with this lab in town,
Boston’s tourism industry will be dead for some period of time.
A striking example was the effect of the SARS outbreak on
tourism in Toronto. Even our own Chinatown
suffered a huge drop in visitors, even though there
was no connection to the SARS outbreak.
BU’s recent tularemia
outbreak revealed total breakdown in biosecurity.
In May and Sept. 2004, three researchers in a Boston University
lab contracted tularemia while working with this
biowarfare microbe. The outbreak of this biowarfare microbe was
not discovered by B.U. until Oct. 2004.
It was not revealed to the public until Jan. 2005, after the city and
state review process for their proposed lab was finalized.
This outbreak of tularemia
from BU’s laboratories is worrisome not because it led to the infection of the
general public. It did not.
However, it does give us insight into how
B.U. operates labs working with bioterrorism
agents. The experiments done with
tularemia are exactly the same experiments they plan
on doing with much more deadly organisms in their
proposed BSL4 lab. The tularemia outbreak
uncovered a complete breakdown in BU's biosecurity:
1) The researchers did not follow the mandatory
protocol nor did they use the available safety equipment.
2) The bacteria used in the experiments got mixed up
and an infectious form was used when they thought they were using a
non-infectious strain.
3) Researchers became ill with the disease that they
were working on, one to the point of hospitalization.
None of these highly trained professionals
noticed this outbreak.
4) Researchers in the lab tested their own blood in
August 2004 and found that they were positive for exposure to tularemia.
What should have been a very disturbing
finding did not trigger any alarms at BUMC.
5) These experiments were not reviewed by the
Institutional Biosafety Committee prior to the start
of the experiment. This was a flagrant
violation of university and federal policy.
It also eliminated the only avenue of public oversight into the lab
activity.
6) BU did not follow public safety protocols of
promptly informing the public health officials of the outbreak of this
bioterrorism agent. They are required to report the
outbreak within 24 hours of suspecting the outbreak. They waited almost two
weeks.
7) B.U. officials and Mayor Menino
intentionally kept this important information from the public during the lab
application review process, choosing to protect the financial interests of the
university and developers over public safety concerns.
BU had a complete breakdown of biosafety with this relatively
mild, curable bacteria and now they say they are ready to work with
deadly, incurable organisms. The tularemia outbreak has proven that they are
not.
BU has provided a highly
flawed Environmental Impact and worst-case scenario assessment for their lab
proposal.
The assessment
of a worst-case release is extremely superficial at best.
BU has chosen anthrax as their released
organism. In assessing the plume of contamination that would be released from
the lab, they measure the exposure of individuals at a single point at ground
level. A true assessment of the exposure
must include a 3-D model of dispersal in the area, taking into account
buildings and the presence of people at many elevations throughout the plume.
Localized wind patterns may lead to
concentrations of anthrax spores in discreet spots within the neighborhood.
The danger posed to
community depends not only on the nature of the released organism, but also on
the health and available healthcare of the resident population.
It is known that the population around the
proposed site suffers abnormally high incidences of asthma and other
respiratory diseases. The population is
also under-insured and may not have access to medical care.
These factors must be taken into account to
get a realistic picture of the risk posed by this lab to the neighborhood.
The choice of anthrax as the
studied organism does not take into account the much greater danger posed by a
true contagion. Accidental or
intentional release of an organism that is spread from person to person poses a
very different set of very serious health risks.
This must also be included in a true
assessment of a worst-case release.
BU’s Environmental Impact
Statement does not look at the dangers posed by transport of
infectious agents through the neighborhood going to and
from the lab.
Jeanne Guillemin has conducted an extensive survey at the site of
the world’s worst release of weaponized anthrax in Sverdlovsk, Russia.
Her comments on BU’s assessment can be found at www.ace-ej.org/BiolabWeb/Biolabdocs/
Guillemincommentsandcoverpage.pdf
BU has a long history of
illegal dumping of toxic materials into the environment.
BU’s failure to report the
outbreak of tularemia from its lab is only the latest in a long list of
violations of existing environmental laws.
The summary can be found at
http://www.ace-ej.org/BiolabWeb/healthandsafety.html.
BU’s proposed lab would be operated in violation of
long-standing city restrictions.
The city has had
restrictions in place for over 20 years that restrict using recombinant DNA
technology in a BSL4 lab. Boston Public
Health Commission’s Recombinant DNA (rDNA) Technology
Use Regulations, Section 3.01 explicitly states:
“rDNA use requiring containment defined by the Guidelines as ‘BSL4’ shall not be permitted in the
City of Boston.” In July
2004, BUMC Associate Provost of Research, Dr. Mark Klempner,
sent a letter to the Commission attempting to explain how such restrictions
will not apply to BU’s proposed lab, since they are performing “legitimate”
research. With this letter, BU officials
demonstrated their blatant disregard of existing city authority over their lab.
Biosecurity can be better protected with Universal Healthcare.
Along with the moral and
financial benefits, universal healthcare will greatly increase our defense
against bioterrorism.
Under Project Bioshield, President Bush
proposes to blanket the country with as-yet-undeveloped biosensors that will
alert us to the presence of a biological attack.
Instead, he should take advantage of the
hundreds of millions of “biosensors” already in place in the country: the
citizens. If every citizen were able to
visit a doctor on a regular basis, we would quickly detect that a new disease
has emerged. This was the finding in
Feb. 2003 of JASON, an independent scientific advisory group that provides
consulting services to the
U.S. government on matters of defense science and
technology. Universal healthcare is how we would truly develop
biosecurity.
Spreading this dangerous
dual-use technology will make us more vulnerable to biological attack.
The National Academy of
Sciences published a report stating that the expansion of the BSL4 system in
the U.S. will lead to the spreading of technology that can be
used for good as well as very evil purposes.
Scientists throughout the country have written that any expansion of
this area of research should take place in a completely open and transparent
manner and in the context of international cooperation.
Proceeding in
secrecy will lead to greater suspicion and an increase in a biological arms
race. That will decrease our own
biosecurity.
In addition, please see the following online material that reinforces
the arguments presented here:
Buying Biosafety — Is the Price Right?
(The New England Journal of Medicine © 05/20/2004)
There are real questions to be asked about the wisdom of establishing
these costly facilities, but the critics are not asking them. ...
[more]
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
(The National Academy of Sciences © 2003)
Biotechnology represents a “dual use” dilemma in which the
same technologies can be used legitimately for human betterment
and misused for bioterrorism. ...
[more]
Biodefense crossing the line
(Federation of American Scientists © 2004)
The rapidity of elaboration of American biodefense programs, their
ambition and administrative aggressiveness, and the degree to which they
push against the prohibitions of the Biological Weapons Convention,
are startling. ...
[more]
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